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Multicultural reference masks the centrality of race and racism to neoliberalism. Race continues to permeate capitalism's economic and social processes, organizing the hyperextraction of surplus value from racialized bodies and naturalizing a system of capital accumulation that grossly favors the global North over the global South. Yet multiculturalism portrays neoliberal policy as the key to a postracist world of freedom and opportunity. Neoliberal policy engenders new racial subjects, as it creates and distinguishes between newly privileged and stigmatized collectivities, yet multiculturalism codes the wealth, mobility, and political power of neoliberalism's beneficiaries to be the just desserts of "multicultural world citizens," while representing those neoliberalism dispossesses to be handicapped by their own "monoculturalism" or other historico-cultural deficiencies. A language of multiculturalism consistently portrays acts of force required for neoliberal restructuring to be humanitarian: a benevolent multicultural invader (the United States, multinational troops, a multinational corporation) intervenes to save life, "give" basic goods or jobs, and promote limited political freedoms.

In all these expressions, an idea of the ethic of multiculturalism as the spirit of neoliberalism dissimulates the reality of the racialized social structure of globalization. How can neoliberalism appear to be in harmony with some version of antiracist goals? What configures and restricts racial politics and meanings to make this possible? More specifically, what allows neoliberalism to incorporate U.S. multiculturalism in a manner that makes neoliberalism appear just, while obscuring the racial antagonisms and inequalities on which the neoliberal project depends?

Seeking to understand neoliberalism's capacity to deploy multiculturalism, I will examine how race and capitalism relate across historical forms of U.S. hegemony and transnational capitalist development after World War II. Howard Winant refers to the postwar period as the time of a "racial break," an era when overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements posed challenges to the limits of racial democracy of such global magnitude that they produced a permanent crisis in white supremacy.¹ Yet, as Winant theorizes, the "racial break" produced only a

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I describe Winant's racial break as a sea change in racial epistemology and politics that follows from the gradual ascendancy of a postwar liberal race formation to a hegemonic position in the United States. In contrast to white supremacy, the liberal race paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism. Antiracism becomes a nationally recognized social value and, for the first time, gets absorbed into U.S. governmentality. Importantly, postwar liberal racial formation sutures an "official" antiracism to U.S. nationalism, itself bearing the agency for transnational capitalism. I argue that this suturing is decisive for racial discourse and politics in that it produces a situation where official antiracisms themselves deflect and limit awareness of the logics of exploitation and domination in global capitalism. In what follows, I examine the general historical development of the liberal race paradigm, focusing my reading symptomatically on racial liberalism, the first phase of the historical development, and on "neoliberal multiculturalism," my designation for its latest phase.

As historical articulations of race and capitalism have shifted—with white supremacy and colonial capitalism giving way to racial liberalism and transnational capitalism and, eventually, to neoliberal multiculturalism and globalization—race remains a procedure that justifies the nongeneralizability of capitalist wealth. Race continues to fuse technologies of racial domination with liberal freedoms to represent people who are exploited for or cut off from capitalist wealth as outsiders to liberal subjectivity for whom life can be disallowed to the point of death.² What is new in the postwar period is that an official liberal and nationalist antiracism tied to U.S. ascendancy itself has become one of those liberal freedoms that works to designate some forms of humanity as less worthy than others.

While liberal race procedures are unevenly detached from a whole-sale white supremacist logic of race as phenotype, they remain deeply embedded in a logic of race as a set of what Nikhil Pal Singh describes as "historic repertoires and cultural, spatial and signifying systems that stigmatize and depreciate one form of humanity for the purposes of another's health, development, safety, profit or pleasure."³ Privileged and stigmatized racial formations no longer mesh perfectly with a color line. Instead, new categories of privilege and stigma determined by ideological, economic, and cultural criteria overlay older, conventional racial categories, so that traditionally recognized racial identities—black, Asian, white, or Arab/Muslim—can now occupy both sides of the privilege/stigma

opposition. (For example, I will examine how an idea of “black pathology” distinguished stigmatized from privileged African American racial formations in the early Cold War and how the multicultural “American-ness” of Alberto Gonzalez or Condoleezza Rice currently stigmatizes undocumented Mexican immigrants and African American dissenters such as Julian Bond.) The new flexibility in racial procedures after World War II means that racism constantly appears as disappearing according to conventional race categories, even as it takes on new forms that can signify as nonracial or even antiracist.

I begin the first section of this essay with a reading of Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 study *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, the watershed document of midcentury racial liberalism.⁴ Fusing a program for integrating African Americans into U.S. democracy to a geopolitical narrative of moral legitimation for U.S. supremacy in a post-colonial world, *An American Dilemma* allows us to catch hold of the suture of liberal antiracism to Cold War U.S. nationalism and transnational capitalism. Recognizing a sea change in racial procedures accompanying the gradual victory of racial liberalism also allows me to bring into relief contemporaneous antiracist thinking in direct opposition to the liberal race paradigm.

In this regard, I will examine in the second section the late work of W. E. B. Du Bois (written from 1947 to 1963) as exemplary of a kind of activist hermeneutics that challenged the paradigmatic logic of racial liberalism in the period while offering an alternative epistemology for knowing race matters. Rooted in a global political economic critique of race and racism, I situate Du Bois’s late work within a black radical or, more inclusively, a race radical tradition of U.S. antiracism. I discern within it a consistent effort to expand racial reference in order to mark the continued unevenness of capitalist development.

In the essay’s third section, I examine neoliberal multiculturalism as a still-consolidating development of liberal race hegemony. I note that neoliberal multiculturalism seeks to function for U.S. global ascendancy now as racial liberalism did for U.S. global power after World War II. It is a central ideology and mode of social organization that seeks to manage racial contradictions on a national and international scale for U.S.-led neoliberalism. It does this through a form of official antiracism, now often reduced to a nonracialism, which hinders thinking about or acting against the biopolitics of global capitalism. I analyze discursive flashpoints of the incorporation of multiculturalism as an alibi for neoliberal policy, including the 2001 USA Patriot Act, the Guantánamo Bay prison camp, and the 2002 and 2006 Bush administration *National Security Strategy*.

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Racial Liberalism and Transnational Capitalism

I return to the moment of the mid-twentieth-century racial break and the initial articulation of postwar racial liberalism to sound out regularities, logics, and structures that continue to influence neoliberal multiculturalism. I examine racial liberalism primarily as an ideology and race regime, rather than as a social movement or political philosophy. That is to say, I am interested in its existence as a regime that both establishes hegemony over the field of racial meanings and contributes vitally to U.S. global hegemony after World War II. Racial liberalism not only polices the epistemological boundaries of what counts as a race matter by creating a discursive terrain that facilitates certain ways of posing and resolving questions, but it also constitutes the terms of social and moral authority by which alliances are constructed between classes and segments of postwar U.S. society.

To that end, it is critical to conceive of racial liberalism and U.S. global ascendancy as mutually constitutive. As anticolonial and antiracist movements gained political power and visibility during World War II, they exposed racial contradictions on a global scale. Politicizing the depth and injustices of Western and white supremacy, they demonstrated that European powers and the United States claimed to be fighting an antiracist and antifascist war, while practicing racism and fascism against people of color in the United States, Europe, and the colonies. For the first time in such a concerted manner and on a broad, international scale, anticolonial and antiracist movements linked U.S. racial and wage slavery to European colonialism. These movements condemned Western imperialisms and recognized white supremacy as an illegitimate and artificial ideology of white and European domination. As the terms of the ideological Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union jelled, racism in the United States and other Western capitalist societies became one of the chief propaganda weapons in the Soviet Union's arsenal. In order to define successfully the terms of global governance after World War II, U.S. bourgeoisie classes had to manage the racial contradictions that antiracist and anticolonial movements exposed. As racial liberalism provided the logic and idiom of such management, it became an essential organizing discourse and force for U.S. postwar society and global power.⁵

At racial liberalism's core was a geopolitical race narrative: African American integration within U.S. society and advancement toward equality defined through a liberal framework of legal rights and inclusive nationalism would establish the moral legitimacy of U.S. global leadership. Evidence that liberal antiracism was taking hold in the United States—civil rights legal victories, black American professional achievement, waning

prejudice—was to prove the superiority of American democracy over communist imposition. It would demonstrate to non-Western countries that the social relations of capitalist modernity were not hopelessly compromised by white supremacy. As Mary Dudziak documents, this narrative served as a governing statement for U.S. propaganda, domestic politics, and culture industries throughout the 1950s and 1960s.⁶

For racial liberalism, the entrance of the state into official antiracist discourses—that is, the interjection of U.S. geopolitics into the field of racial formations and meanings—was decisive. Earlier antiracisms connected to the heterogeneous struggles of people of color, and anticolonial movements often linked racial and economic justice. In contrast, racial liberalism sutured an official antiracism to a U.S. nationalism itself bearing the agency for transnational capitalism. This suture produced a liberal nationalism that normed and restricted the field of race politics, such that antiracist discourse itself came both to deflect counternationalisms (especially in the context of early Cold War Americanism) and to mask the workings of the transnational capitalism. As Penny Von Eschen demonstrates, leading visions of antiracism in the black public sphere in the 1940s were internationalist and political economic in their purview, dominated by discussions of Pan-Africanism, Jim Crow imperialism in Africa, the Nigerian General Strike of 1945, and the South African Miner's Strike of 1946.⁷ With the ascendancy of racial liberalism and the freezing into place of Cold War repression, official liberal antiracism marginalized discussions of race and labor as well as race and global political economy as suspicious in light of American resolve against Soviet communism.

We can catch hold of the suture of liberal antiracism to U.S. nationalism for racial liberalism and transnational capitalism in Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. The foundational text of racial liberalism, Myrdal's study set the terms for Cold War liberalism and discourse on race for the next two decades, making it one of the most influential race relations studies in U.S. history.⁸ For my purposes, Myrdal's study provides a textual focus for epistemological analysis. It makes evident the core racial logics of racial liberalism. Myrdal's study concludes:

The treatment of the Negro is America's greatest and most conspicuous scandal. For colored peoples all over the world, whose rising influence is axiomatic, this scandal is salt in their wounds. . . . If America in actual practice could show the world a progressive trend by which the Negro finally became integrated into democracy, all mankind would be given faith . . . and America would have gained a spiritual power many times stronger than all her financial and military resources. . . . America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her opportunity.⁹

It is important to note that the study's purview is as much geopolitical as racial. As racial liberalism incorporated antiracism and "the Negro" into the calculations of U.S. governmentality, racial equity became a means to secure U.S. interests. Racial equity was not an end in itself. Consequently, racial epistemology and politics were altered such that state-recognized antiracisms would have to validate culturally powerful notions of the U.S. nation-state and its foremost interests. Because the scope of the political in the postwar United States precisely shields matters of economy from robust democratic review, the suturing of liberal antiracism to U.S. nationalism, which manages, develops, and depoliticizes capitalism by collapsing it with Americanism, results in a situation where "official" antiracist discourse and politics actually limit awareness of global capitalism.

An American Dilemma omits from its capacious study practically any mention of black left politics and culture, as Nikhil Singh has recently observed.¹⁰ One of its only indications that economy has something to do with racism comes in a discussion of employment discrimination. Thus years before red-baiting would narrow mainstream race politics into what has been called the civil rights compromise, liberal nationalism all on its own, without anticommunism, can be seen to bracket the global political economic critique of race and capitalism that had pervaded anticolonial and antiracist thinking in the first half of the twentieth century.

In short, as racial liberal discourse became hegemonic in the 1950s, not only did race disappear as a referent for the inequality of the historical development of modern capitalism (a referentiality hard-won by earlier antiracisms). Official antiracism now explicitly required the victory and extension of U.S. empire, the motor force of capitalism's next unequal development. Where placing the United States in the history of European colonialism had energized earlier antiracist movements led by people of color, from the "victory" of racial liberalism over white supremacy onward, official antiracisms in the United States remain under the injunction to take U.S. ascendancy for granted and to remain blind to global capitalism as a race issue.

Racial liberalism also sublated racial contradictions after World War II for U.S. global ascendancy by obscuring the most visible racial antagonism of white supremacy: blanket white skin privilege. Introducing flexibility into white supremacist ascriptions of privilege solely on the basis of phenotype or racial descent, racial liberalism overlaid conventional white/black racial categories with alternate criteria for distinguishing privilege and stigma arising from a liberal model of race as culture. The replacement of white supremacy's biological paradigm with a liberal paradigm defining racial formations as cultural formations has long been heralded as a victory against scientific racism. While the victory is not to be gainsaid, we

must also consider how racial liberalism's cultural model extended racial discipline and procedures beyond the color line by splintering whiteness and blackness into privileged and stigmatized forms based on normative cultural criteria.

What has not been fully understood about racial liberalism's cultural paradigm is that it redefines *race* as *culture* only after the idea of culture in the United States has been saturated with connotations of "national culture" as a moral and spiritual (anticommunist) ideal. In other words, American culture (presumed in Myrdal's study to be animated by an American Creed of equality, opportunity, and liberty) was perceived through wartime ideas of America as a universal nation and a model democracy. As racial liberalism redefined race as culture, it also promoted an idea of a racially inclusive U.S. national culture as the key to achieving America's manifest destiny and proof of American exceptionalism and universality. Under such conditions, any racial/cultural deviations from an ideal national culture connote negative deviations—in other words, grounds for "legitimate" exclusion of some from the wealth and freedoms presumed to be commonly available to all Americans. Viewing it in this light, we can grasp racial liberalism's cultural model of race as one that actually renewed race as a procedure for naturalizing privilege and inequality.

For white racial formation, racial liberalism renewed white privilege by constituting the white liberal American as the most felicitous member of the U.S. nation-state on the grounds of his or her liberal antiracist disposition. Myrdal sets the stage for a new, heroic form of liberal whiteness in *An American Dilemma* by defining "the Negro problem" as a "moral dilemma," "a problem in the heart of the American," meaning white Americans.¹¹ The study then portrays the white American who can solve this moral and psychological dilemma—who undergoes a heroic moral conversion and assents to the fundamental equality of African Americans—to be a privileged identity. In the passage below, *An American Dilemma* personifies America as a liberal white American and describes this character as key to the fulfillment of American manifest destiny: "If America should follow its own deepest convictions, its well-being at home would be increased directly. At the same time America's prestige and power abroad would rise immensely. The century old dream of American patriots, that America could give the entire world its own freedoms and its own faith, would become true. . . . America saving itself becomes savior of the world."¹² Here we see a privileged racial formation in the making. The process not only absorbs nationalism into the field of racial formation, producing the liberal white American as fairly privileged on the grounds of patriotism, but it also simultaneously creates American national identity as a privileged racial

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formation on the global scene. To be American is to occupy the place of the universal subject, for which whiteness was once the synecdoche, with the authority to intervene, order, and rationalize that such universality entails. Once the conflation of whiteness with the universal is recalibrated through the discursive matrix of liberal antiracism, race itself disappears. As we see from the absence of “Negro” or even “the Negro problem” in the passage above, racial reference gets erased as racial liberalism enfoldes African Americans into the representation of “America” as a providential, universal nation.

Racial liberalism’s model of race as culture normed by an idealized American national culture also made it possible to ascribe stigma to segments of African American society without the act of ascription appearing to be an act of racial power. Instead, it appeared as fair, expected, and right. It did so by differentiating between “healthy” African American cultural formations (those aligned with idealized American cultural norms and nationalist sentiment) and “pathological” ones. Racial liberalism then explained black cultural “pathology” to be both the effect of racism (that is, cultural maladaptation to social prejudice) and the cause of black inequality, in effect deploying liberal antiracism to renew racial stigma and to disavow structural racism. In *An American Dilemma*, we are presented with two contrasting evaluations of African American culture. Either the “Negro” is judged “thoroughly American in his whole outlook and perception of the world” or African American culture is represented as a pathological effect of racism: “*In practically all its divergences, American Negro culture is not something independent of the general American culture. It is a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of the general American culture.*”¹³

Thus we see that under racial liberalism the Negro either is folded into state representation as an equivalent for the American ideal (a race-erased “general American culture”) or is pathologized. Most chillingly, liberal antiracism itself now becomes a vehicle for organizing African American compliance with Americanism. Black politics, culture, experience, and analysis incompatible with American cultural norms and nationalist sentiment (notably black socialist internationalism) become signs of black pathology, alongside poverty and underachievement. Racial liberalism’s culture model for race thus worked to restrict racial meanings and politics to comply with “official” liberal antiracism and to foreclose discussions of African American political and cultural autonomy and the dynamics of race and racism in the postwar expansion of transnational capitalism.

Race Radicalism in the Late Work of W. E. B. Du Bois

Racial liberalism of course never fully captured racial meanings or delimited racial politics. A hegemony is not the same thing as an entire social formation, although “its very condition is that a *particular* social force assumes the representation of a *totality* that is radically incommensurate with it.”¹⁴ Against the thinking of liberal race hegemony, let us now examine the antiracist thinking oppositional to racial liberalism that postwar circumstances also produced. Here I seek to delineate some of the characteristic moves and statements of an activist hermeneutics that we might think of as racial liberalism’s persistent critique.

Clearly, in doing race theory, we can distinguish more than one kind of critical thinking that opposes liberal race paradigms. For my purposes, I delineate and treat as unified a particular epistemological formation with historical weight in the U.S. context that I identify as “race radical analysis.” My object here overlaps with “black radicalism” as Cedric Robinson defines it.¹⁵ For Robinson, black radicalism names not only social and political movements, such as Pan-Africanism and Black Nationalism. Importantly, black radicalism also names a cultural-analytical process, a historically transmitted, critical consciousness grounded in black cultural matrices and struggles for liberation. Such struggles make visible and seek to inhabit moral, intellectual, ethical, and political positions antagonistic to contemporaneous configurations of racial capitalist modernity.¹⁶ The consciousness Robinson describes arises out of not only black cultural matrices but also heterogeneous racial histories and contexts. Although the late work of W. E. B. Du Bois is easily situated within the black radical tradition, I note that my reading of his work is influenced not only by scholars of African American studies but also by scholars for whom the post-1965 changes in immigration laws and consequent influx of Asian and Latina/o groups to the United States is decisive.¹⁷ For my purposes, what unifies the category of “race radicalism” is the attempt to rupture how race as a sign has been consolidated with the cultural, ideological, and social forces of liberal movements and to reconsolidate race as a sign with the cultural, ideological, and social forces of worldly and radical antiracist movements and the critical perspective they generate on race as a genealogy of global capitalism.

Just as the text of Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* serves as an optic through which to isolate the typical logics and procedures of racial liberalism, the late writings of W. E. B. Du Bois (dating from roughly World War II to his death in 1963) help to isolate characteristics of an activist hermeneutics that has consistently opposed liberal race paradigms to

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make apparent how, as capitalist social relations change, race remains a procedure that justifies the nongeneralizability of capitalist wealth. Mid-century race radical analysis started from coordinates that racial liberalism attempted to foreclose: black cultural and political autonomy, anticolonial solidarity, and global political economic critiques of race and racism.¹⁸ It named Cold War conditions as neocolonial, lamented the consolidation of capitalist wealth as a threat to U.S. democracy, and viewed racial liberalism as a new kind of racism.

While my goal is not to provide the definitive judgment on Du Bois's scholarship, my analysis does demand a reevaluation of the late work. When we read the late journalism and scholarship of Du Bois as an immense effort to analyze and disrupt emergent racial liberalism, the theoretical and political sophistication of his late canon becomes clear. This then negates the scholarly judgment that finds Du Bois's late work to be out of sync with the times and uncharacteristically weak-minded.¹⁹ Against new racial logics and procedures that sutured a liberal antiracism to U.S. nationalism for the expansion of transnational capitalism, Du Bois's late work conjures a vision of a more worldly and radical antiracism that, importantly, would link racial to economic democracy. Simultaneously, it seeks a metaphysics for an alternative, antiracist, ethico-economic world order, occasionally finding such precedent in possibilities embedded but under siege within black culture and historical consciousness.

Understanding Du Bois's late work as a persistent critique of racial liberalism, we see the importance of two major new positions he takes, positions that are often disparaged or ignored by his commentators: Du Bois's public performance of the role of a black communist and his revision of his famous 1903 thesis centering the color line as the problem of the new century. By the time Du Bois joined the Communist Party of the United States in 1961, the position of "black communist" was no longer widely legible as an antiracist identity, thanks to the success of liberal nationalist antiracism. Du Bois's membership in the Communist Party has been caricatured as a show of support for Stalinism. However, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois* offers us another explanation.²⁰ In opposition to racial liberal versions of African American life stories, which represented black success as evidence of the legitimacy of U.S. global power, Du Bois in *The Autobiography* narrativizes his life story as the formation of a critical consciousness about race in the development of capitalism. This connection compels him to testify against U.S.-led transnational capitalism and to desire an antiracist international socialism, one not identical to Soviet communism.

By the mid-1950s, racial liberalism could incorporate the popular

interpretation of Du Bois's 1903 statement, "The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line."²¹ In reaction, Du Bois rearticulates his thesis to emphasize that the problem of the color line has been and remains fundamentally an economic issue: "Here then is the fundamental question of our day: How far can nations who are at present most advanced in intelligence . . . and technique keep their wealth without using the land and labor of the majority of mankind mainly for the benefit of the European world and not for the benefit of most men, who happen to be colored?"²² Against the referential logic of racial liberalism that would erase the primary relevance of the economic in race matters, Du Bois's new formula calls attention to the fact that without a democratic redistribution of wealth, postcolonial conditions will deepen a process of economic stratification in which the preservation of race lines will be far from incidental (pace the passage's closing sarcasm).

Along with these strategies, a particular logic of metaphor characterizes Du Bois's late work. It fills vocabulary associated with white supremacy, slavery, and colonialism with urgent, new meanings that contradict racial liberalism's coding of these regimes as fading into the archaic and as incompatible with a U.S.-led global order. Instead of the limited awareness of global capitalism that liberal antiracism enforces, Du Bois's metaphors illuminate the continuation of forms of biopolitical domination characteristic of racial capitalism. For example, a series of Du Bois's articles published from 1947 to 1949 examining the influence of U.S. capital on the African continent describes the situation as a "new imperialism" and a kind of "stream-lined slavery."²³ Transporting meaning across what liberal race paradigms portray as distinct temporal divisions, such vocabulary depicts the control that wealthy nations exercise over the lives and bodies of people in postcolonial states to repeat fundamental characteristics of previous racial capitalist regimes. Thus, with U.S.-led finance capitalism and global decolonization, "slavery and serfdom transform into wage labor and military force" and "the Oil Institute [now] replaces the Cotton Kingdom of Slavery and Sugar Empire of the Buccaneers."²⁴

Such metaphorology employs the vocabulary of past articulations of racial capitalism to refer to present geopolitical conditions. It allows us to see the continuity of racial slavery in wage slavery and to condemn configurations of race and capital in the postwar present as a neocolonial repetition of a colonial past. We see an extension of it in the language Du Bois employs to imagine a more robust antiracism that would be linked to international socialism rather than transnational capitalism. Du Bois's writings regularly refer to communist and socialist movements as "the new abolitionism." The term requires us to understand that new configurations

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of capitalism necessarily incorporate new forms of racialized domination. As such, any robustly antiracist program, which would be truly "abolitionist" in calling for an end to new forms of racialized (wage) slavery, would have to call for the replacement of capitalism with socialism. Similarly, Du Bois redubbed the McCarran Act of 1950, requiring members of the American Communist Party and affiliated organizations to register with the attorney general, the "Fugitive Slave Act of 1950."²⁵ In its most optimistic vein, Du Bois's late work calls for an alternative international socialism (different from Soviet blueprints) to be born from cultures that have experienced race as a technology of dehumanization historically intrinsic to capitalist development. In his *Autobiography*, for example, Du Bois presents a vision of China as a nonwhite, socialist utopia, the better to counter visions of the United States as a superficially multiracial but inherently white capitalist utopia.²⁶

Du Bois's late work also opposes liberal paradigms of race as culture, which stigmatized black culture dissonant to an idealized national culture as pathological or subversive. In contrast, Du Bois's late work depicts some aspects of black culture in the United States as bearing a tenuous historical reflex, a fusion of epistemology and habit inimical to the social values of capitalism, from which new ethico-economic relations might emerge. *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois* names this reflex an "inner Negro cultural ideal," and describes it as a consciousness "developed by memory of slavery and experience of caste."²⁷ Although it admits that the ideal has been endangered by the distortion of black history, the weakening of cultural memory, and increasing intraracial class division, *The Autobiography* also works to strengthen the ideal by centering on an ethic of self-sacrifice. It textually notes the transitory incarnation of an ethic of self-sacrifice in behaviors, gestures, and epistemological tendencies attached to individuals and institutions appearing in the life story.

For instance, it finds it in the figure of Josie, a young woman in whom Du Bois discerns "an unconscious moral heroism that would willingly give all of life to make life broader, deeper, and fuller for her and hers."²⁸ It finds it to be present in the sorrow songs and in the rituals of Du Bois's family. Similarly, it extols Atlanta University for instilling in its students a determination "to spread with their own hands the Gospel of Sacrifice."²⁹ Ultimately, this culturally embedded ethic of self-sacrifice, which prioritizes other directedness and sacred-making behaviors over self-interest and material wealth, comes to represent a waning but abiding habit. Still present in midcentury African American cultural formations, Du Bois sees it as a formation onto which a desire for socialism might be grafted.

From these examples, we can isolate in Du Bois's late work a consistent analytic that opposes racial liberal paradigms that we can designate race

radical analysis. Where racial liberalism seeks to sublate racial antagonisms by policing what counts as race politics, race radical analysis, as we see in Du Bois's late work, reads racial reference back in, revealing continuities between prewar colonial capitalism and postwar U.S. global ascendancy and expanding transnational capitalism. Where racial liberalism disconnects antiracism and economic justice, denying race as a structure of capitalist organization, it develops a referential system that deploys race to mark the continued unevenness of capitalist development. Where racial liberalism inaugurates a restrictive, official state antiracism, we see in Du Bois's late work an effort to suture a global political economic critique of race and racism to a call for socialism. Where racial liberalism defines "race as culture" in a manner that makes an idealized national culture the arbiter of privilege and stigma (creating new racialized subjects beyond conventional racial divisions), Du Bois's race radical analysis defines black culture as a vehicle for a historically transmitted consciousness. Such consciousness resists nationalist Cold War ideology by using race as a hermeneutics to expand the domain of democratic accountability to include such matters as economic governance.

Neoliberal Multiculturalism: What Can Brown Do for You?

How do race and capitalism relate in the current moment of U.S. global power? In what follows, I describe the contemporary relation between race and capitalism as a historical development of the liberal race thinking and politics that emerged after World War II with the victory of racial liberalism over white supremacy.³⁰ I term this new, still-consolidating development "neoliberal multiculturalism." As racial liberalism did for U.S. global ascendancy in the early Cold War, neoliberal multiculturalism seeks to manage racial contradictions on a national and international scale for U.S.-led neoliberalism.

"What can Brown do for you?"—the slogan for the United Parcel Service (UPS)—nicely sums up racial reference in the era of neoliberal multiculturalism. In the 1970s, "brown" emerged as an antiracist coalition-building term among people of color, a shorthand for racial pride and solidarity, short-circuiting restrictive "black or white" notions of race relations. UPS's Brown keeps the color but blots out the people and the movement. Even as it erases manifest antiracist reference, Brown appropriates earlier, positive associations of *brown* with pride, warmth, solidarity, and functioning community networks. More insidiously, it also plays on racist associations of people of color with service. "What can Brown do for you?" thus takes a watchword of progressive 1970s antiracism and turns

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 status groups.

it into a slogan of happy subservience promising efficient access to the networks of the global economy. By appropriating and abstracting earlier racial reference, what Brown does for UPS is sell its services. What U.S. multiculturalism does for neoliberalism, as we shall see, is analogous: it legitimates as it obfuscates.

In this section, I consider how neoliberal multiculturalism repeats some of the core procedures of racial liberalism. It sutures official anti-racism to state policy in a manner that hinders the calling into question of global capitalism, it produces new privileged and stigmatized forms of humanity, and it deploys a normative cultural model of race (which now sometimes displaces conventional racial reference altogether) as a discourse to justify inequality for some as fair or natural. The racial contradictions that such procedures disavow or manage for global capitalism today manifest both within and beyond color lines. On the one hand, the racial divisions engendered by white supremacy, colonialism, and slavery continue in the hyperextraction of surplus value from racialized bodies, as we find in free trade zones, sometimes called “new slave zones” for their killing conditions of labor and their legal impunity to exploit workers of color. Similarly, a racial-economic schema continues to associate white bodies and national populations with wealth and nonwhite bodies and national populations with want, naturalizing a system of capital accumulation that grossly favors the global North over the global South. On the other hand, neoliberal multiculturalism breaks with an older racism’s reliance on phenotype to innovate new ways of fixing human capacities to naturalize inequality. The new racism deploys economic, ideological, cultural, and religious distinctions to produce lesser personhoods, laying these new categories of privilege and stigma across conventional racial categories, fracturing them into differential status groups.

Both components of the term *neoliberal multiculturalism* have important conventional usage histories. *Neoliberalism* was first used by Thatcherites to describe a return to nineteenth-century free trade. Because liberalism in England (as in most of the world) was associated with business conservatism, in the United States British neoliberals were originally aligned with U.S. neoconservatives. The political history of U.S. neoliberalism begins with the Democratic Leadership Council under Clinton’s first administration, which also advocated free trade, while promoting it as a means to reinvigorate the antisexism and antiracism of Cold War liberalism. Current political neoliberalism under the George W. Bush administration combines Clinton’s superficial multiculturalism with the aggressive neoconservatism and imperialism of the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.³¹ *Neoliberalism*, however, now most commonly refers to a set of economic regulatory policies including the privatization of public resources, financial

liberalization (deregulation of interest rates), market liberalization (opening of domestic markets), and global economic management.³²

In defining neoliberal multiculturalism, I work with a more expansive understanding of *neoliberalism* as a term for a world historic organization of economy, governance, and biological and social life.³³ We can think of neoliberalism as an organization of political governance by recognizing the paradigm shift in its demand that nation-states act in the first place as subsidiary managers of the global economy.³⁴ We can recognize neoliberalism as a rationalization of biological and social life on the basis of the violence that individuals and communities have had to absorb with social and economic restructuring for neoliberalism.³⁵

The conventional usage history of the term *multiculturalism* begins in the 1970s, when it denoted grassroots movements in primary and secondary education for community-based racial reconstruction. By the late 1980s, the valence of the term had expanded, taken a cultural turn, and become controversial. For some, *multiculturalism* meant resistance to Euro-American norms and a renewal of protest against white racism. For its centrist and neoconservative detractors, it represented an attack on America's common culture. For its progressive detractors, *multiculturalism* became a byword for a kind of accommodation that replaced a focus on substantive political and economic goals with an emphasis on cultural diversity. Since the 1990s, *multiculturalism* has become a policy rubric for business, government, civil society, and education. Those who continue to use it to describe movements for justice on the part of historically marginalized groups often lean on modifiers to emphasize an idea of "strong" or "transformative multiculturalism."³⁶

While some of my insights overlap with those of the term's progressive detractors, my usage of the term *multiculturalism* in *neoliberal multiculturalism* comes out of my attempt to discern the characteristic logics of liberal race formations after World War II in relation to the development of transnational capitalism. Specifically, I refer to the contemporary incorporation of U.S. multiculturalism into the legitimating and operating procedures of neoliberalism, conceived as a world-historic organization of economy, governance, and social and biological life.

Although the formation began to take shape under the first Clinton administration, the current Bush administration is an advanced purveyor of neoliberal multiculturalism. The defense of indefinite detention at Guantánamo Bay prison camp is a stunning example. Multicultural codes do not generally oppose or contradict the holding and interrogation of Arab and Muslim "detainees" at the Guantánamo prison camp. To the contrary, the Bush administration consistently deploys multicultural language and signifying practices to make the detention appear just, despite

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the abrogation of the Geneva conventions. Providing prisoners with copies of the Koran, granting them time to pray, and other markers of cultural sensitivity represent Guantánamo not as a betrayal of U.S. multicultural ideals, but as the logical extension of them for the so-called war on terror. Furthermore, a multiculturalist U.S. exceptionalism justifies the flaunting of international law that Guantánamo represents. According to its logic, multiculturalism in the United States is so singular and successful that the nation embodies the universal, so that U.S. government and military actions are to be understood as being for a supranational good. As U.S. multiculturalism becomes a marker of legitimate privilege and universality, monoculturalism becomes a category of stigma that justifies torture. We might say that in Guantánamo, Arab and Muslim detainees are given copies of the Koran and nothing but, so that they may be tortured, while in Abu Ghraib prison, specific acts of torture (forced alcohol drinking and masturbation) produce the tortured as a caricature of “Islam violated.”³⁷ This new racism successfully obscures the continuation of older racial antagonisms (that is, Arab vs. white) in the present. At the same time, it extends racializing practices and discipline beyond the color line, recreating “multicultural” and “monocultural” as new privileged and stigmatized racial formations semidetached from conventional racial categories.

Neoliberal multiculturalism revises racial liberal reference and logic. Like racial liberalism, contemporary neoliberal multiculturalism sutures official antiracism to state policy in a manner that prevents the calling into question of global capitalism. However, it deracializes official anti-racism to an unprecedented degree, turning (deracialized) racial reference into a series of rhetorical gestures of ethical right and certainty. Concepts previously associated with 1980s and 1990s liberal multiculturalism—“openness,” “diversity,” and “freedom”—are recycled such that “open societies” and “economic freedoms” (shibboleths for neoliberal measures) come to signify human rights that the United States has a duty to secure for the world.

We see this in the Bush administration’s 2002 *National Security Strategy*, in which “opening” markets signifies as a multicultural imperative. According to the document’s logic, opening societies to the diversity of the world (meaning its investment capital and products) fulfills the spirit of multicultural inclusiveness that would “include all the world’s poor in the expanding circle of development.”³⁸ Similarly, the document’s rhetoric of “freedom” collapses freedoms of commerce (“economic freedom . . . a moral right . . . freedom to pick and to choose”) with social freedoms (of religion, association, etc.), transforming economic freedoms into multicultural imperatives by rhetorical transference. According to this “official” race-erased and militarized antiracism, “America’s experience as a great

multi-ethnic democracy” obligates the United States to secure “political and economic liberty” for “every person, in every society.”

The 2006 version of the Bush administration’s *National Security Strategy* ups its claims for “economic freedom” and the divine responsibility of the United States to secure these for all people as “principles true and right for people everywhere.”³⁹ It relies specifically on a neoliberal multicultural discourse of “economic rights” that incorporates the rhetoric of civil rights to portray “economic rights” as the most fundamental civil right and to advocate in an absolutist manner for deregulation, privatization, regulated “free markets,” and other neoliberal measures as the only way to guarantee economic rights.

The 2006 *National Security Strategy* also deploys neoliberal multiculturalism to accuse economic and political movements opposed to neoliberal measures of racism and authoritarianism. Earlier, the 2002 *National Security Strategy* attached the label *racism* to communism and fascism through a nebulous rewriting of twentieth-century history as the victory of “freedom and equality” over “destructive totalitarianism” and its “militant visions of class, nation and race.”⁴⁰ In the 2006 *National Security Strategy*, the specter of racism returns but is now connected to those who currently oppose the administration’s “Economic Freedom Agenda,” a group that includes left-leaning governments in South America, fundamentalist political Islam (al-Qaeda), and disgruntled immigrants and people of color within Europe and the United States. According to the *National Security Strategy*, enslavement, or susceptibility to it, characterizes all of these groups. Resistance to neoliberal measures in South America is depicted as “anti-free market authoritarianism,” with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez singled out as “a demagogue awash in oil money undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.”⁴¹ Fundamentalist political Islam is characterized as a new racist totalitarianism marked by “intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement and repression.” Finally, any mobilization on the part of the racialized poor in Europe and the United States against the effects of globalization is banned from recognition by portraying this class as strangely susceptible to terrorist seduction: “Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in society. Such groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states.” Like racial liberalism, neoliberal multiculturalism overlays conventional phenotypical racial categories with new systems for ascribing privilege and stigma, interjecting flexibility into race procedures. Racial liberalism accomplished this by bringing liberal nationalism into racial formation (creating the white liberal as a privileged nationalist antiracist identity and

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the “culturally black” African American as a stigmatized un-American racial formation). Today neoliberal multiculturalism incorporates a supra-nationalism into racial formation that privileges the multicultural American citizen as a subject more universal and legitimate than even the multicultural world citizen. Correspondingly, it stigmatizes some forms of personhood seen to conflict with neoliberal subjectivity as “monocultural” and therefore lesser. Multicultural reference sustains both sides of the new privilege/stigma dichotomy.

For example, a multicultural, multiracial U.S. Armed Forces is symbolically counterposed to the figure of the monocultural Arab or Muslim terrorist. Alberto Gonzalez, a Mexican American U.S. attorney general, serves as a kind of signpost for multiculturalism by virtue of his racialized body and his Mexican descent. As such an embodiment, he obscures the otherwise clearly racist implications of a renewed assault on Mexican and Arab “illegal aliens.” Similarly, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice have served as human symbols of the presumed “achievement” of a multiracial, multicultural democracy in the United States. As African American secretaries of state, they have distracted from deployments of U.S. state power to enforce the biopolitical restructuring required by neoliberalism and its negative effects on the racialized poor in target countries.

To round out the Bush administration’s neoliberal racial coalition with Asian immigrants, we can point to U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao and Viet Dinh, the legal architect of the Patriot Act. Elaine Chao, a symbol of successful Asian American integration (in addition to being the first Asian American cabinet member, Chao is married to the current Senate Majority Whip Mitch McConnell of Kentucky), distracts from the particular impact of neoliberal policy on women workers in Asia (especially China), while Viet Dinh’s status as a child refugee from communist Vietnam diverts attention away from the racialized policing of Arabs and Muslims that the Patriot Act licenses.

The Patriot Act is another example of neoliberal multiculturalism’s revision of racialized privilege and stigma. It rhetorically privileges Arab Americans in order to discriminate against—and to obscure discrimination of—Arabs, Muslims, or South Asians in the United States who cannot or do not claim to be American in a nationalist or idealist sense. The act begins with a lengthy section titled “Sense of Congress Condemning Discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans.”⁴² This multiculturalist gesture of protection for patriotic “Arab Americans,” “Muslim Americans,” and “Americans from South Asia” rhetorically excuses the racializing violence that the act enables—namely, the stripping of civil and human rights from nonpatriotic or non-American Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. In all the examples above, neoliberal multiculturalism

arranges racial meaning to mitigate the charge of racism (according to conventional race categories), while innovating a new racism that rewards or punishes people for being or not being “multicultural Americans,” an ideological figure that arises out of neoliberal frameworks.

Neoliberal multiculturalism also revises racial liberalism’s model of race as culture. In this new version, “culture” no longer replaces older, biological conceptions of race; it displaces racial reference altogether. Detached from the history of racial conflict and antiracist struggle, “culture,” as the displacement of racial reference, nonetheless remains associated with ideas of “diversity,” “representation,” and “fairness.” These legitimating concepts are now formalized to the extent that political conservatives can designate themselves a “culture” and demand fair representation in universities on identitarian grounds. As culture talk displaces racial reference, it combines with antiterrorist discourse to produce cultural racisms seemingly immune from politicization as “race issues.” Mahmood Mamdani discusses this as the trick of distinguishing between “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims.”⁴³ The paradigm of “culture as the displacement of racial reference” also means that domestic projects of ideological policing regularly have recourse to the language of multiculturalism. This language is particularly ironic when it is used to punish established antiracists, such as when the Bush administration accuses the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People of “intolerance” or when historically black colleges and universities are pressured to increase “diversity.”⁴⁴

The most important difference between racial liberalism and neoliberal multiculturalism is that the latter appears more consistently as domination, not hegemony. Despite an overabiding sense of language disorder (that a language of antiracism continually produces its opposite without being held accountable), racism, in a shadow form, appears readily. We see the shadow of lynching photographs in the digital camera shots of tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib.⁴⁵ We see the shadow of slave courts and black codes in the 2002 and 2003 Department of Defense memoranda stating that the reality of torture lies in the intentions of the interrogator. And we see the shadow of racial apartheid in the international and intranational class apartheid that upholds the profits and security of the wealthy over the needs of the poor.

This not-yet-successful hegemony provides an opportunity to revitalize an antiracism in the tradition of race radicalism—that is, an antiracism that does not simply include economic demands but prioritizes the inequalities of global capitalism as the primary and foundational race matter. Critical race theory that will contribute to the project has to foreground the differences that distinguish the logics of liberal race regimes (contemporary neoliberal multiculturalism in particular) from those of

white supremacy. Foremost, we must recognize the suturing of “official” liberal antiracism to U.S. nationalism as an agent for transnational capitalism; we must acknowledge the subsequent deployment of seemingly antiracist or postracist language to legitimate U.S. global power and the unevenness of capital accumulation; and we must identify the fixing into place of privileged and stigmatized racial formations beyond color lines that naturalize global capitalism’s unevenness as fair or natural.

Neoliberal Multiculturalism versus Critical Race Theory: *Against Race?*

When the distinction between liberal and white supremacist racial logics is not made, we sometimes find discordant affinities between progressive critical race scholarship and neoliberal advocates such as the Bush administration. For me, Paul Gilroy’s *Against Race* symptomatizes the problem. Gilroy’s jeremiad against “raciology” (the idea of an authentic, immutable organic connection between bodies, selves, and identities), which he finds to be the common conceptual framework for twentieth-century European fascism, contemporary media/corporate commodification, and African American political culture alike (especially black nationalism), provides an excellent critique of anthropological concepts of race. However, it ironically overemphasizes an older logic of racism still active in the present (the Ku Klux Klan and the Nation of Islam rank high among Gilroy’s examples of contemporary fascist raciology). Neoliberal multiculturalism already condemns this version of racism and uses it to make racism in general appear as disappearing, even as it adapts racial procedures to innovate new forms of racialized wage slavery such as one finds in the free trade zones of the global South. Similarly, Gilroy’s advocacy of a distinctly nonracial planetary humanism echoes, if only rhetorically, neoliberal multiculturalism’s own nonracialism. Both depoliticize the economic dimensions of the current articulation of race with capitalism and race itself as a technology of power not reducible to biology, identity, or ontology. (In the volume that follows *Against Race*, Gilroy shifts emphasis: rather than an appeal to abandon race thinking, he now calls for a confrontation with the enduring powers of racism and comments on the ability of U.S. imperial power to make “multiculturalism an aspect of the clash of integral and incompatible civilizations.”)⁴⁶

While we must continue to refute the old race thinking, we need an antiracism that can speak about how neoliberalism perpetuates racial capitalism, an antiracism that can politicize forms of biopolitical domination that move beyond conventional racial categories. Du Bois in his late

work expanded the referential scope of abolitionism to show how racial slavery continued in wage slavery and to advocate for economic democracy (socialism, the “new abolitionism”) in the name of racial equality. Today, heterogeneous projects and voices assert the inseparability of the fight against racism and the fight against neoliberalism. The movement for prison abolition in the United States immediately stands out, particularly as theorized by Angela Davis, Joy James, and Ruth Gilmore.⁴⁷ So does the vision Evo Morales articulates when he declares his election victory in Bolivia and state control over natural gas to be the beginning of the end of five hundred years of discrimination against indigenous people in the Americas and five hundred years of colonialism.⁴⁸ Will the new race radicalism capture racial reference affirmatively enough to discredit neoliberalism’s appropriation of U.S. multiculturalism and to diminish its version of a just global order? These are open questions that the foregoing speculations invite.

Notes

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1. Howard Winant, *The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 133–36.

2. See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 138.

3. Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 223.

4. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

5. On the rise of racial liberalism, see Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Brenda Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

6. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 47–79.
7. Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
8. For a discussion of *An American Dilemma* as a watershed study of U.S. race relations, see David Southern, *Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of An American Dilemma, 1944–1969* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1987); David Michael Scott, *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880–1996* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Steven Steinberg, *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy* (Boston: Beacon, 1995); and Walter A. Jackson, *Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1987* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
9. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 1021–22.
10. Singh, *Black Is a Country*, 144.
11. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, lxxi.
12. Ibid., 1022.
13. Ibid., 928; original emphasis.
14. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics* (New York: Verso, 1985), x.
15. Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
16. Robinson's concern is to describe a “black radical tradition” that differs from Western radicalisms (his chief example is Marxism) in that it involves a different historical role for consciousness. While he gives a genealogy of the black radical tradition as a social movement—maroonage, slave revolt, anticolonial struggle, Pan-Africanism—the thrust of his work is to make the black radical tradition appear as an epistemological, ideological, and philosophical movement that continually congeals into black resistance even as it constantly arises anew out of it. For Robinson, the contradiction to the dialectical matrix of capitalist slavery and imperialism was “the historical and social consciousness of Africans,” a “shared order of things” exoteric to the “racial metaphysics of Western consciousness.” As this contradiction evolves, new capitalist social relations replace old ones, yet a dynamic consciousness transmitted in culture and reworked through long-term crises remains a kind of “culturally embedded epistemological measure . . . that deemed racial capitalism to be unacceptable.” See Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 71–74, 171, and 313.
17. These include Lisa Lowe (*Immigrant Acts* [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996]) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (*A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999]).
18. See Gerald Horne, *Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); and Robin Kelley, *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).
19. For a description of Du Bois as a self-blinded idealist in the 1950s and 1960s, see William Cain, “From Liberalism to Communism: The Political Thought of W. E. B. Du Bois,” in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).
20. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers Co., 1968).

21. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago: A. C. McLurg, 1903), 13.
22. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Wealth of the West vs. a Chance for Exploited Mankind," *National Guardian*, November 28, 1955, reprinted in *Newspaper Columns by W. E. B. Du Bois*, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Aptheker (White Plains, NY: Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited, 1986), 939.
23. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Kenya's People on the Move," *People's Voice*, November 29, 1947, reprinted in Aptheker, *Newspaper Columns*, 2:830; and W. E. B. Du Bois, "Watch Africa," *National Guardian*, January 3, 1949, reprinted in Aptheker, *Newspaper Columns*, 2:863.
24. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Cannot This Paralyzed Nation Awake?" *National Guardian*, April 12, 1954, reprinted in Aptheker, *Newspaper Columns*, 2:926.
25. W. E. B. Du Bois, "No Progress without Peace," *National Guardian*, October 4, 1950, reprinted in Aptheker, *Newspaper Columns*, 2:876.
26. See especially Du Bois, *The Autobiography*, 396–409.
27. *Ibid.*, 392.
28. *Ibid.*, 116.
29. *Ibid.*, 212.
30. I thank Mark Denning for the title of this section.
31. My thanks to Will Jones for the above articulation of the political genealogy of neoliberalism. Because of the way they are brought together in practice under the current Bush administration, I downplay the differences between neoliberalism and neoconservatism.
32. Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000).
33. We can date the first phase of neoliberalism as a world historic constellation from the end of the 1970s, with the election of Thatcher and Reagan, their reorientation of state activity from the welfare state to supply-side economics, the growing importance of finance capitalism for global capital accumulation, a paradigm shift from state-centered development to free markets and structural adjustment programs, and the movement toward perestroika. For another definition of *neoliberalism* as a world historic formation, see David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 157–61.
34. In indebted countries, for example, neoliberal policies require states to recover costs for debt servicing from social programs such as health and education, while, in wealthy nations, neoliberal agendas shift the priorities of state and civil society from service to citizens to capital maximization. See Chandan Reddy, "Asian Diasporas, Neoliberalism, and the Family: Reviewing the Case for Homosexual Asylum in the Context of Family Rights," *Social Text*, nos. 84–85 (2005): 101–19.
35. On these grounds, neoliberalism has been perceived to be a kind of imperialism arising out of the twinned predominance of U.S. military and economic power, as this consolidated in the 1980s with Reaganomics and semiprivatized warfare against nationalist and socialist governments in Latin America and continues today with neoliberal privatization through warfare in Iraq and Haiti. See Tariq Ali, *Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads, and Modernity* (New York: Verso, 2003); Harvey, *The New Imperialism*; Naomi Klein, "Free Trade Is War," *Nation*, September 29, 2003, www.thenation.com/doc/20030929/Klein (accessed August 12, 2006); and Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004).

36. See Avery F. Gordon and Christopher Newfield, "Multiculturalism's Unfinished Business," in *Mapping Multiculturalism*, ed. Avery F. Gordon and Christopher Newfield (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 76–115.
37. I thank Chandan Reddy for this formulation.
38. The White House, National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed July 27, 2004).
39. The White House, National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006 (accessed May 1, 2006).
40. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002).
41. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006).
42. U.S. House of Congress, Rep. James F. Sensenbrenner, Sponsor, "USA Patriot Act (H.R. 3162)," published online by the Library of Congress, thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.03162: (accessed May 26, 2006).
43. Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, 17.
44. Former Bush White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett referred to the NAACP leadership as "intolerant" during a press briefing quoted in "Kerry's Speech to NAACP Takes Swipes at Bush," Associated Press, 15 July 2004. On the pressure to increase diversity at historically black colleges and universities, see "Do the White Thing: Black Colleges Try to Promote Diversity while Maintaining Character," www.jointcenter.org/databank/educationfinal/1997%20Educational%20Digest/Enrol-HiEd/reference1.htm (accessed November 17, 2005).
45. On this point, see Susan Sontag, "Regarding the Torture of Others," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 May 2004.
46. Paul Gilroy, *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* (London: Routledge, 2004), 1.
47. Angela Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* (New York: Open Media, 2003); Ruth Gilmore, *Golden Gulags: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); and Joy James, *The New Abolitionists: (Neo)slave Narratives and Contemporary Prison Writing* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).
48. BBC News, "Morales Inaugural Speech: Excerpts," 22 January 2006, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4638030.stm.